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NOTES 
A WEB OF LIABILITY:  DOES NEW 
CYBERBULLYING LEGISLATION PUT PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS IN A STICKY SITUATION? 
Matthew Fenn* 
 
Bullying has long been a concern for students, parents, and schools.  
However, the explosion of communication technology has transformed the 
nature of bullying, allowing “cyberbullies” to extend their reach far beyond 
the physical schoolyard.  This development creates uncertainty for schools, 
legislatures, and courts in assessing when and where schools should be 
permitted to regulate student behavior. 
The growing number of tragic cyberbullying incidents, as well as 
national media coverage, has forced legislatures to take action.  This has 
manifested itself in a number of different statutory forms and approaches.  
The most aggressive legislation appears to impose new duties on school 
districts and individual schools to police and prevent cyberbullying.  
Increased liability will likely accompany these new duties.  This could be 
problematic since courts have been protective of students’ off-campus free 
speech rights when schools have acted aggressively to combat 
cyberbullying. 
This Note argues that the potential for new liability that schools may 
face, while perhaps appropriate, will put schools in a “lose-lose” situation.  
Schools that choose to act in accordance with new legislation will 
undoubtedly face legal challenges by cyberbullies, claiming violations of 
free speech rights.  Schools that hesitate to act may face liability for failing 
to fulfill their new statutory duties to protect victims of cyberbullying.  In 
order to balance these competing interests, courts should apply existing 
legal standards more deferentially to allow schools to combat cyberbullying 
effectively while also respecting the First Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2011, administrators at a Georgia middle school were confronted 
with a difficult situation.1  Parents of a student reported that their daughter 
received nasty glances and harsh comments from her peers when she 
arrived at school one day.2  She didn’t know why until she logged onto 
Facebook.3  She discovered a fake Facebook profile with her name and 
information and a doctored profile picture.4  The profile said she smoked 
marijuana, spoke a language called “Retardish,” and made it look as though 
she made frequent sexual and racist posts on other Facebook users’ 
profiles.5  Though the student was clearly upset, the administrators felt 
compelled to tell the student and her parents there was little they could do 
because the Facebook bullying occurred off campus.6  Police said the 
same.7 
Across the country in California, school administrators were forced to 
tackle a similarly sticky situation on a different, burgeoning form of social 
media.8  A group of students had gone to a local restaurant after school and 
recorded a four and a half minute video on a cell phone, calling another 
student a “slut,” talking about “boners,” and saying the girl was “the ugliest 
piece of shit [they’d] ever seen in [their lives].”9  The recorder of the video 
posted it to YouTube.com later that evening and sent messages to 
classmates, telling them to watch it.10  She also contacted the subject of the 
 
 1. See Gregg Bluestein & Dorie Turner, School Cyberbullying Victims Fight Back in 
Lawsuits, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2012, 7:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/04/26/school-cyberbullying-vict_n_1457918.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 
(C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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video and told her the same.11  By the end of the night, the video had 90 
“hits,” or visits.12  When the student-victim arrived with her mother at 
school the next morning, her peers were already abuzz with conversation 
about the video.13  In contrast to the Georgia scenario, school administrators 
decided to investigate their disciplinary options.14  Their attorney advised 
that the recorder-publisher of the video could be suspended.15  
Administrators suspended the student for two days, but a court found that 
this violated the student’s First Amendment rights.16 
Another vicious scenario is only starting to fill court dockets but is 
increasingly confronting school administrators.17  In 2005, Kara Kowalski, 
a high school senior, created a group webpage on MySpace.com from her 
home computer.18  She titled the webpage “S.A.S.H.,” which she claimed 
stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes,” but which another student stated 
was an acronym for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes.”19  Shay was another 
of Kowalski’s classmates.20  Kowalski invited about 100 of her MySpace 
contacts to join the group, and roughly two dozen of her classmates 
joined.21  Ray Parsons, the first of Kowalski’s friends to join the group, 
posted several photos to the webpage.22  The first was a picture of Parsons 
and a friend holding their noses and displaying a sign that said, “Shay Has 
Herpes.”23  Another was a photograph of Shay that Parsons edited, drawing 
red dots on her face to simulate herpes and drawing a sign near her pelvic 
region that said, “Warning:  Enter at your own risk.”24  A third picture was 
posted, a photograph of Shay displaying the caption “portrait of a whore.”25  
Several other classmates responded to the pictures with their own posts, 
laughing or ridiculing Shay.26  When Shay’s father found out about the 
website, he contacted Kowalski, Parsons, and the school.27  The school 
board informed the principal that discipline was appropriate, and the 
principal began an investigation into who created the website, joined the 
group, or posted disparaging pictures and remarks.28  School administrators 
found that Kowalski, in creating the group website, had violated the school 
policy against “harassment, bullying, and intimidation,” and she was 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1098–99. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1099. 
 16. Id. at 1122. 
 17. See Bluestein & Turner, supra note 1. 
 18. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 568. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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suspended for five school days with a ninety-day “social suspension” 
prohibiting her from participating in any extracurricular activities.29  
Kowalski brought suit against the school for violating her First Amendment 
rights.30  Almost four years later, the Fourth Circuit ultimately found the 
school’s actions permissible.31 
Sometimes administrators avoid court but are left with a far more 
problematic and tragic result of electronic bullying—a student’s suicide.32  
In late 2009, Phoebe Prince’s family moved from Ireland to suburban 
Massachusetts, and she enrolled as a freshman in the local high school.33  
She began dating a popular boy in the senior class.34  Soon thereafter, she 
started receiving demeaning text messages throughout the day and, when 
she turned on her computer, groups of her peers were harassing her on 
social networking sites.35  Some school administrators and teachers learned 
of the problem but ultimately did not take action.36  Months later, tormented 
and depressed, Prince hanged herself, leaving those in her community 
wondering what could have been done to prevent this tragic loss.37 
Teachers and school administrators face dilemmas such as these with 
increasing frequency every day.38  While deciding how to discipline bullies 
has always been a tough task for educators, rapidly evolving technology has 
made these decisions even more difficult, as a student’s actions off campus 
can increasingly affect activity on campus.39  A school administrator may 
choose to act aggressively to help the student being harassed electronically, 
in which case she risks being sued for impeding the harassing student’s 
First Amendment rights.40  On the other hand, the school administrator may 
act cautiously in light of First Amendment concerns, in which case she may 
 
 29. Id. at 568–69. 
 30. Id. at 570. 
 31. Id. at 567. 
 32. See, e.g., Erick Eckholm & Katie Zezima, 9 Teenagers Are Charged After Suicide of 
Classmate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A14; see also Jessica P. Meredith, Note, 
Combating Cyberbullying:  Emphasizing Education over Criminalization, 63 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 311, 312–16 (2010) (describing three particularly high-profile cases of cyberbullying 
that ended in suicide and gained national attention). 
 33. See Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 32. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Karla Schultz, Free To Be Mean?  What Are the First Amendment Rights of 
Bullies?, LEADERSHIP INSIDER, Aug. 2011, at 3. 
 39. See generally Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Bullies Move Beyond the 
Schoolyard:  A Preliminary Look at Cyberbullying, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 148, 
154–55 (2006). 
 40. See Schultz, supra note 38, at 3–4; see also Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case for 
Strengthening School District Jurisdiction To Punish Off-Campus Incidents of 
Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 271 (2008) (describing the current trend of courts 
liberally granting First Amendment protection to off-campus speech, even if it is vulgar, 
cruel, sexually explicit, or threatening). 
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risk being sued by the victim or her parents for allowing further harm to 
occur.41 
State legislatures have almost universally reacted to this growing 
problem by either revising old bullying statutes or enacting new 
legislation.42  In crafting or amending their bullying and cyberbullying 
laws, many states have potentially imposed new duties on schools, 
administrators, and teachers to monitor and police cyberbullying.43  The 
Supreme Court has yet to rule on a school’s ability to regulate students’ off-
campus speech, and lower courts have produced a morass of conflicting 
standards and results.44  This leaves educators in a confusing and precarious 
situation when it comes to making increasingly common disciplinary 
decisions.45 
This Note examines recent cyberbullying legislation in concert with 
current cyberbullying jurisprudence, both of which have combined to make 
school officials feel as if they are in a “lose-lose” situation.46  Part I 
explores traditional bullying and a school’s duty to regulate it, and then 
examines the unique social and legal challenges that arise in cases of 
cyberbullying.  Part II compares state legislatures’ expansive responses to 
cyberbullying to courts’ somewhat restrictive treatment of off-campus 
student speech.  Part III argues that courts should hold schools responsible 
for legislatively imposed duties to police cyberbullying but posits that, in 
order to avoid trapping schools in a web of liability, courts should also be 
more deferential when examining disciplinary actions taken to counteract 
cyberbullying. 
I.  BULLYING:  FROM THE SCHOOLYARD TO THE INTERNET 
This part contrasts the social and legal implications of traditional 
bullying and modern cyberbullying.  Part I.A traces the social history of 
bullying and outlines bullying legislation resulting from a change in 
national attitudes toward the subject.  Part I.B examines the legal 
expectations of public schools in regulating traditional bullying and the 
standards for liability they may face for failing to police on-campus 
bullying properly.  Part I.C describes the rise of cyberbullying and the 
 
 41. See Schultz, supra note 38, at 4; see also Sonja Trainor, School Bullying Poses Legal 
Issues for School Boards, LEADERSHIP INSIDER, Aug. 2011, at 1 (noting the increase in 
complaints filed against school districts in the wake of bullying); infra Part II.A.3. 
 42. See infra Part II.A.1–2. 
 43. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 44. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 45. See Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Laws and School Policy:  A Blessing or a 
Curse?, CYBERBULLYING RES. CENTER (Sept. 28, 2010, 4:23 PM), http://cyber
bullying.us/blog/cyberbullying-laws-and-school-policy-a-blessing-or-curse.html (“[S]chool 
administrators are in a precarious position because they see many examples in the media 
where schools have been sued because they took action against a student when they 
shouldn’t have or they failed to take action when they were supposed to.  Schools need help 
determining where the legal line is.”). 
 46. See id.; see also Schultz, supra note 38. 
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unique practical and legal challenges it presents for schools and legislators 
in comparison to traditional bullying.  Lastly, Part I.D chronicles Supreme 
Court cases that have addressed student speech off campus. 
A.  Bullying:  An Age-Old Problem Becomes a New National Emergency 
This section looks at traditional forms of bullying to lay out the proper 
context to understand cyberbullying.  It then sets out a definition of 
traditional bullying and examines the historical manifestations of bullying 
in schools and the prevailing attitudes of the past.  Next, it explores the 
current state of bullying in schools and traces a shift in the national 
consciousness.  Finally, this section surveys the landscape of state bullying 
laws that resulted from this national attention. 
1.  Traditional Bullying:  A Historical Perspective 
Bullying is an age-old, common form of violence among youth that 
traditionally manifests itself at school, on the way to or from school, or in 
public places such as playgrounds or bus stops.47  Several common 
thematic threads run through the many varied definitions of bullying.  First, 
bullying typically includes an element of harassment, where one individual 
or group targets another individual or group with unprovoked aggression.48  
Second, bullying generally grows more insidious and violent over time.49  
Third, bullying often involves either an actual or perceived power 
differential between the attacker and the victim.50 
Bullying is certainly not a new problem.  Even a cursory look at ancient 
fairy tales such as Cinderella or classic literature like The Lord of the Flies 
reveals the timeless concern of harassers who leverage actual or perceived 
power to push others around repeatedly.51  Nor is bullying a new 
occurrence in the school setting.52  While prevalence data varies widely 
depending on the scope and nature of the study, most research in the past 
 
 47. See Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 148.  Patchin and Hinduja note that, while 
traditional bullying can take place in any physical setting, it often occurs in or around school. 
Id. 
 48. See id. at 150. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id.  Patchin and Hinduja note that many characteristics can contribute to this 
uneven power dynamic—popularity, physical strength or stature, social competence, quick 
wit, extroversion, confidence, intelligence, age, sex, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic 
status are some of the more common contributors. Id.  They also point out, though, that 
studies examining which characteristics are the best predictors of who becomes a bully have 
been inconclusive. Id. 
 51. See generally WILLIAM GOLDING, THE LORD OF THE FLIES 1 (1954); Jacob Grimm & 
Wilhelm Grimm, Cinderella, in FAIRY TALES FROM THE BROTHERS GRIMM 116, 116–17 
(Philip Pullman trans., Viking Penguin 2012) (1812). 
 52. See Bonnie Bell Carter & Vicky G. Spencer, The Fear Factor:  Bullying and 
Students with Disabilities, 21 INT’L J. SPECIAL EDUC. 11, 11–12 (2006) (describing 
America’s history of bullying in addition to documenting bullying statistics from other 
nations’ pasts); see also Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 148. 
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few decades has concluded that between 10 to 20 percent of students are 
victims of traditional forms of bullying.53 
Twenty to thirty years ago, however, the national attitude toward 
bullying was significantly different.54  It was regarded as a typical 
experience of one’s childhood or a “rite of passage” to be endured by every 
adolescent.55  Bullying was misunderstood not only by parents and 
educators, but by academics and researchers, as well.56  Consequently, little 
action was taken to address or manage it effectively, both in the classroom 
and elsewhere.57 
2.  A Shift in the National Consciousness 
Over the last two decades, social attitudes toward bullying have 
continued to change.58  Some scholars pinpoint the tragic shooting massacre 
at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, as a turning point, as it 
was widely reported that classmates ostracized the shooters.59  More 
broadly, many researchers look to a rash of violent and highly publicized 
incidents at schools across the country in which aggressors reported being 
bullied or outcast beforehand.60  In the wake of these tragedies, bullying 
was thrust into the national spotlight and began to be viewed as a 
substantially dangerous, pervasive problem.61  Thus, there has been 
 
 53. See Carter & Spencer, supra note 52, at 11–12. 
 54. See id. at 11. 
 55. See id.  While attitudes toward bullying have largely changed, this antiquated view 
still manifests itself in the responses of some educators. See, e.g., L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms 
River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. 2007) (noting that, in response to a 
student’s complaints of severe, pervasive harassment, a guidance counselor told the student 
to “toughen up and turn the other cheek”). 
 56. See Carter & Spencer, supra note 52, at 11. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. at 12; Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 151. 
 59. See Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 151; see also Erb, supra note 40, at 257–59 
(comparing the effect of the Columbine shooting on the national consciousness surrounding 
bullying to that of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and America’s approach to terrorism). 
 60. See Carter & Spencer, supra note 52, at 12; Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 151 
(pointing to school violence research of thirty-seven incidents from 1974 to 2000, which 
showed that out of the forty-one “attackers” involved, twenty-nine, or 71 percent, reported 
feeling bullied, persecuted, or injured before the attack).  In particular, many point to the 
case of Megan Meier, a teenager who was bullied online until she committed suicide—it was 
later revealed that the mother of her classmate was the aggressor. See, e.g., Darryn Cathryn 
Beckstrom, State Legislation Mandating School Cyberbullying Policies and the Potential 
Threat to Students’ Free Speech Rights, 33 VT. L. REV. 283, 283–84 (2008); Meredith, supra 
note 32, at 312–16; Jonathan Turley, How To Punish a Cyber-Bully, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 
2007, at A25. 
 61. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also A.O. Scott, Behind Every 
Harassed Child?  A Whole Lot of Clueless Adults, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at C10 
(explaining how the release of a highly acclaimed documentary, Bully, exemplifies the 
“emergence of a movement” and a “shift in consciousness” with respect to bullying); 
Bullying Prevention, AD COUNCIL, http://www.adcouncil.org/Our-Work/Current-Work/
Safety/Bullying-Prevention (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (describing the campaign to create a 
series of national television and print ads promoting awareness of bullying). 
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increased pressure on both lawmakers and school officials to tackle the 
issue.62 
In light of this newfound attention, researchers have increasingly focused 
on the effects of bullying.63  Studies have conclusively shown that bullying 
victims often exhibit suicidal ideation, eating disorders, chronic illness, 
depression, difficulty concentrating, and avoidance behavior.64  This may 
lead the victim to exhibit violent outbursts or criminal behavior.65  At other 
times, the victim withdraws and avoids social interaction and, specifically, 
school and classmates.66  As a result, the academic performance of victims 
decreases significantly.67  Furthermore, these effects seldom go away when 
bullying ends, often hurting the victim’s developmental trajectory and 
continuing to affect the victim well into adulthood.68  This research has 
made schools a more obvious stakeholder in curbing bullying and has added 
to the pressure on schools to address the issue.69 
3.  A National Boom in Bullying Legislation 
The national spotlight on tragic incidents of bullying and subsequent 
research on its effects had a direct impact on policymakers and state 
legislatures across the country.70  As of December 2012, forty-nine out of 
 
 62. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 63. See, e.g., Carter & Spencer, supra note 52, at 12; Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, 
at 151. 
 64. See Carter & Spencer, supra note 52, at 12; Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 
151. 
 65. See Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 151. 
 66. Carter & Spencer, supra note 52, at 12; Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 151. 
 67. See Carter & Spencer, supra note 52, at 12. 
 68. See Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 151; see also Jennifer Senior, Why You 
Truly Never Leave High School, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 20, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/
features/high-school-2013-1/ (examining findings by psychologists on the impact that 
adolescent experiences have on human behavior into adulthood). 
 69. See, e.g., infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 70. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.1 (West Supp. 2012) (“The Legislature finds 
and declares that . . . [a] 2009 study by the United States Departments of Justice and 
Education, ‘Indicators of School Crime and Safety,’ reported that 32% of students aged 12 
through 18 were bullied in the previous school year.  The study reported that 25% of the 
responding public schools indicated that bullying was a daily or weekly problem . . . .  A 
2009 study by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘Youth Risk 
Behavior Surveillance,’ reported that the percentage of students bullied in New Jersey is 1 
percentage point higher than the national median . . . . In 2010, the chronic persistence of 
school bullying has led to student suicides across the country, including in New Jersey . . . . 
School districts and their students, parents, teachers, principals, other school staff, and board 
of education members would benefit by the establishment of clearer standards on what 
constitutes harassment, intimidation, and bullying, and clearer standards on how to prevent, 
report, investigate, and respond to incidents of harassment, intimidation, and bullying . . . .  It 
is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this legislation to strengthen the standards and 
procedures for preventing, reporting, investigating, and responding to incidents of 
harassment, intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school and off school 
premises[.]”); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 10 (McKinney Supp. 2013) (“The legislature finds that 
students’ ability to learn and to meet high academic standards, and a school’s ability to 
educate its students, are compromised by incidents of discrimination or harassment including 
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fifty states had adopted some type of antibullying legislation aimed at either 
suggesting or mandating action on the part of public schools.71  Only 
Montana has not statutorily addressed the issue in any respect.72 
In states that have affirmative bullying legislation, the language and 
breadth of coverage vary widely from state to state.73  Some states have 
mandated that schools or school districts put policies in place but have not 
specifically delineated what these policies must include.74  Other states 
have given policymaking authority to school districts with clearly defined 
areas of coverage that must be included with respect to antibullying.75  A 
third group of states has enacted “zero tolerance” laws that prohibit defined 
categories of behavior and charge school boards with determining 
corresponding levels of punishment.76  Lastly, some state statutes have 
mandated additional school responsibilities, such as reporting requirements, 
character education for students, and staff training programs.77 
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Education has articulated a 
renewed dedication to help eradicate bullying.78  The Department also 
 
bullying, taunting or intimidation.  It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state to afford 
all students in public schools an environment free of discrimination and harassment.  The 
purpose of this article is to foster civility in public schools and to prevent and prohibit 
conduct which is inconsistent with a school’s educational mission.”). 
 71. See Samir Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws:  A Brief Review 
of State Cyberbullying Laws and Policies, CYBERBULLYING RES. CENTER (Nov. 2012), 
http://cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf. 
 72. See id.  Victims of schoolyard bullying in Montana must look to other bases for a 
cause of action, such as federal law or common law negligence in tort. See generally Anne 
M. Payne, Establishing Liability of a Public School District for Injuries or Damage to a 
Student Resulting from Bullying or Other Nonsexual Harassment by Another Student, 105 
AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 93, 117–23 (2009) (discussing other avenues for bullying victims 
to bring claims). 
 73. See generally Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 71. 
 74. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(2)(a)(K) (2012) (mandating that school 
districts create a “safe school plan” that incorporates a “specific policy concerning bullying 
prevention and education”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-21 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (“The 
department [of education] shall establish guidelines for bullying prevention policies to be 
promulgated by local school boards.  Every local school board shall promulgate a bullying 
prevention policy program by August 2011.  Every public school shall implement a bullying 
prevention program by August 2012.”). 
 75. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-34 (Supp. 2012) (outlining areas to be addressed 
by the department of education in implementing a policy). 
 76. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 234.1 (West Supp. 2013) (requiring school districts to 
adopt a policy prohibiting bullying); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (LexisNexis Supp. 
2012) (same). See generally Philip T.K. Daniel, Bullying and Cyberbullying in Schools:  An 
Analysis of Student Free Expression, Zero Tolerance Policies, and State Anti-harassment 
Legislation, 268 EDUC. L. REP. 619, 635–38 (2011).  Daniel notes that while these are 
specific in the sense that they delineate what schools must prohibit, they are controversial 
because they give schools authority to discipline a broad range of conduct. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (West Supp. 2012) (mandating all three); see 
also, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-145 (2012) (requiring that public schools establish a 
character education program); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (establishing reporting 
requirements). 
 78. See Letter from Arne Duncan, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues (Dec. 16, 
2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/101215.html (“Recent 
incidents of bullying have demonstrated its potentially devastating effects on students, 
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recently “reminded” educators that the federal government interprets 
several previously enacted federal statutes to be triggered by instances of 
bullying.79  For instance, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin;80 Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sex;81 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197882 and Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 199083 prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of disability.  Thus, if the bullying at issue is based on any of these 
protected classes, a federal civil rights statute may be implicated.84 
B.  A Public School’s Duty To Regulate On-Campus Bullying 
The previous section addressed a shift in the national attitude toward 
bullying and the resulting legislative boom.  This section examines the 
circumstances in which schools may be responsible for policing bullying 
activity.  In cases where a victim of on-campus bullying by another student 
wishes to hold a school district or its employees liable, the victim must 
show negligence on the part of the school.85  This section considers the 
elements of negligence in the context of a school facing liability for harm 
resulting from bullying.  It then addresses a public school’s potential 
immunity from suit and looks at how a school might breach its duty if one 
is owed.  Lastly, this section considers how the action or inaction of a 
school “causes” the injury or harm in a case of bullying. 
1.  Duty To Protect Students 
In order for any actor to be liable for harm, it must owe a duty to the 
person harmed.86  At its essence, “duty” is an obligation to conform to a 
particular standard of conduct in relation to another.87  In a negligence case, 
the duty question is often framed as whether the defendant is under any 
particular obligation to act or refrain from acting for the benefit of the 
 
schools, and communities and have spurred a sense of urgency among State and local 
educators and policymakers to take action to combat bullying.  The U.S. Department of 
Education . . . shares this sense of urgency and is taking steps to help school officials 
effectively reduce bullying in our Nation’s schools.”). 
 79. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Asst. Sec’y, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Colleagues (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201010.pdf. 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
 81. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 12131. 
 84. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 79. 
 85. See, e.g., M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 679–
81 (Ct. App. 2003); Mirand v. City of N.Y., 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49–51 (1994).  All elements of 
negligence must typically be proven even if the victim brings suit under a state or federal 
statute. See Silano v. Bd. of Educ., 52 Conn. Supp. 42, 63–64 (Super. Ct. 2011). 
 86. See generally W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 
(5th ed. 1984). 
 87. See id. at 356. 
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plaintiff.88  In a school bullying case, the question becomes whether the 
school had a legal responsibility to protect a particular student from 
bullying.89  A person or entity may have a duty imposed by statute or 
implied in common law.90  As both statutes and common law are always 
evolving, the concept of duty evolves as well.91  Thus, a school’s legal duty 
to protect its students from bullying will change along with common law 
and state and federal statutes. 
As a general rule, one does not owe a duty to protect another from the 
conduct of a third party in the absence of some special relationship between 
either the defendant and the person at risk or the defendant and the third 
party.92  This is equally true for government entities and employees acting 
for the benefit of the public under the public duty doctrine.93  The public 
duty doctrine states that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of 
the general public rather than specific individuals; thus, the municipality 
and its agents owe a duty of care to the public at large but not necessarily to 
specific individuals in the absence of a special relationship.94 
Like duty, a special relationship can either be created statutorily or 
derived from common law principles.95  In the context of a government 
actor, the question of whether a statute creates a duty to the public or to 
 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Silano, 52 Conn. Supp. at 52–53; Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 641–43 
(Va. 2012). 
 90. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 133, at 311–12 (2000). 
 91. See KEETON, supra note 86, at 359 (“[A]s our ideas of human relations change the 
law as to duties changes with them.”). 
 92. See Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 641–42; M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 679 (Ct. App. 2003). See generally DOBBS, supra note 90, § 227, at 579 
(“[T]he orthodox view is that the defendant is free to watch an unsighted person step in front 
of a car, even if, with no inconvenience or danger to himself, the defendant could have called 
out a warning.  The defendant, it is said, has no duty to act affirmatively for the benefit of 
others in the absence of some special relationship.”). 
 93. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 76 (2012); 
DOBBS, supra note 90, § 271; see also Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 642 (drawing a distinction 
between a duty owed to the “citizenry at large” and a special duty owed to a specific, 
identifiable person). 
 94. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.  Dobbs points out that a number of states 
have either explicitly or implicitly distanced themselves from the public duty doctrine. 
DOBBS, supra note 90, § 271, at 725–26 n.23 (citing court decisions from Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin). 
 95. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 93, § 85 (outlining a number of factors that courts 
consider when determining the existence of a special relationship). Compare Panama Buena 
Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 679–80 (holding that a common law special 
relationship is formed between a school district and its students, partly because of the 
compulsory nature of education, but also because of the unquestionable right of all students 
to an environment fit for learning), and Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 641–43 (finding a that a special 
relationship exists at common law between a principal and a student because the school has 
custody of the student while at school), with Silano v. Bd. of Educ., 52 Conn. Supp. 42, 53 
(Super. Ct. 2011) (explaining that, in the school context, a duty is not owed “to the public” 
but must be statutorily imposed to the individual student). 
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specific individuals is often a matter of statutory construction.96  This is an 
inherently context-specific exercise with the outcome depending on the 
facts of the case presented, the specific language of any statutes that may 
support a claim, and the general common law principles in a given 
jurisdiction.97  For a school, this means that its duty to protect students from 
bullying depends largely on its state’s law and the specific facts of the 
instance of bullying.98 
Another divisive duty question is its scope.  In other words, if the rule of 
law is that one must not injure his neighbor, a natural question might be, 
who counts as a “neighbor?”99  This question prompted the famous debate 
between then–Chief Judge Cardozo and Judge Andrews in Palsgraf v. Long 
Island Railroad, in which Cardozo held that one only owes a duty of care to 
a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff.100  This approach has been criticized 
because it may put judges in the position of deciding fact-specific questions 
better left for a jury on the other elements of negligence, and it may allow 
judges to make policy determinations better left to the legislature.101  
Nonetheless, in most states today, courts determine whether the defendant 
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff by asking whether the risk, the injury, or 
the person injured were reasonably foreseeable.102  Thus, in the context of 
school bullying, a school must typically be on notice of the risk, the 
 
 96. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 93, §§ 75–76; DOBBS, supra note 90, § 142, at 333 
(“Courts do not adopt a statutory standard or rule to govern tort cases if they believe the 
statute creates only a ‘public duty.’  Put differently, violation of a statute that creates a public 
duty only and not a duty to individuals is not negligence per se.”). Compare Dornfried v. 
Berlin Bd. of Educ., No. CV064011497S, 2008 WL 5220639, at *9–10 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 26, 2008) (looking to legislative intent to determine that Connecticut’s antibullying 
statute was enacted primarily to impose reporting and information gathering requirements on 
schools and did not create a duty to individual students), with L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms 
River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 546–47 (N.J. 2007) (reading the New Jersey 
Law Against Discrimination to impose a duty on schools to reasonably address an individual 
student’s repeated complaints of discriminatory bullying).  Dobbs argues that when courts 
declare that statutory duties flow only to the public and not to individuals, they are usually 
stating a judicially preferred rule and not a real construction of the statute. DOBBS, supra 
note 90, § 142, at 333–34 (“The results may be correct in many cases, but the arguments are 
sometimes dubious.”). 
 97. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 93, § 85. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) 580 (appeal taken from Scot.); 
KEETON, supra note 86, § 53, at 358–59. 
 100. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also Dobbs, supra note 90, § 230, at 584–85. 
 101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7 cmt. j (2005). See generally W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability:  The New 
Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. 
L. REV. 739 (2005). 
 102. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1258 n.47 (2009); see also Jasperson v. Anoka-Hennepin 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. A06-1904, 2007 WL 3153456, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 
2007) (explaining that, in Minnesota, schools owe a common law duty to protect children but 
only to protect against conduct that is foreseeable and could have been prevented with 
ordinary care); Wood v. Watervliet City Sch. Dist., 30 A.D.3d 663, 663–64 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2006) (positing that the foreseeability of one student harming another generally requires 
either actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct). 
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potential for injury, or the particular student being bullied, for a court to 
find that a duty existed.103 
In sum, whether or not a school owes a duty to prevent the harm in 
question may depend on the specific facts of the case presented, the 
statutory bases for the plaintiff’s claim, and any common law principles of 
duty in the jurisdiction where suit is brought.  Thus, when a school 
administrator confronts an instance of bullying, state law and the context of 
the situation largely dictate how he may respond. 
2.  The Sovereign Immunity Defense 
Even if a bullying victim can establish that a school has a statutory or 
common law duty to him or her, the school may be immune from suit under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.104  This doctrine states that school 
districts, public school officers, administrators, principals, superintendents, 
teachers, and employees are generally entitled to immunity from personal 
liability in tort for discretionary acts or omissions in the course of their 
employment, so long as their conduct was not willful or malicious.105  
States follow this rule either statutorily106 or at common law,107 with 
varying approaches discussed below. 
One important difference among states is when exactly the presumption 
of sovereign immunity arises.  Perhaps the most extreme approach is 
Georgia’s, where a state agency may only waive sovereign immunity by an 
act of the legislature, and the Georgia Tort Claims Act expressly precludes 
school districts and other “local authorities” from such a waiver.108  Under 
this standard, a government entity cannot face liability in tort unless the 
plaintiff can show that the state actor was willful or malicious, or that the 
 
 103. See, e.g., Jasperson, 2007 WL 3153456, at *4–5; Wood, 30 A.D.3d at 663–64. 
 104. See, e.g., Albers v. Breen, 806 N.E.2d 667, 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); see also 
KEETON, supra note 86, § 131, at 1032.  Some scholars question whether immunity and “no 
duty” really are two different inquiries since they have the same result in negligence 
actions—dismissal of the claim. See DOBBS, supra note 90, § 225, at 575–76. 
 105. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 93, § 27; see also, e.g., Silano v. Bd. of Educ., 52 
Conn. Supp. 42, 52 (Super. Ct. 2011); Jasperson, 2007 WL 3153456, at *6. 
 106. See, e.g., Albers, 806 N.E.2d at 673–74 (sovereign immunity established by Illinois’s 
Tort Immunity Act); Moore v. Hous. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 358 S.W.3d 612, 615–16 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2011) (sovereign immunity established by Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability 
Act). 
 107. See, e.g., Silano, 52 Conn. Supp. at 52; see also Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 
646 (Va. 2012) (explaining that Virginia recognizes both statutory and common law forms of 
sovereign immunity). 
 108. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-21-22(5), 23(a) (2012); see, e.g., Chisolm v. Tippens, 658 
S.E.2d 147, 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (interpreting the Georgia Tort Claims Act to restrict 
any waiver of sovereign immunity by a school district).  Massachusetts has a similar, 
although slightly less hard-line, approach.  The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act provides for 
waiver of sovereign immunity in limited circumstances but retains immunity for public 
employees failing to act or prevent harmful acts of third parties unless the condition or 
situation was originally caused by the public employee; this usually requires an “affirmative 
act.” See Parsons v. Town of Tewksbury, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 555, at *3 (Super. Ct. 2010). 
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actions were not discretionary.109  The most common approach is a grant of 
sovereign immunity as long as the state legislature has not expressly denied 
immunity for the act in question.110  Under this standard, a plaintiff must be 
able to point to a statutory or constitutional violation that creates a private 
right of action against state actors.111  A third approach is based in common 
law and essentially presumes sovereign immunity, barring any of three 
exceptions:  (1) if conduct is malicious, wanton, or intended to injure; (2) if 
a statute provides for a private cause of action for failing to enforce a 
specific law; or (3) if failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable 
person to imminent harm.112 
Sovereign immunity typically only exempts a state actor from suit if his 
or her actions were discretionary, as opposed to a decision that merely 
implements preexisting policies and regulations.113  Whether a defendant 
may assert a sovereign immunity defense, then, will depend on the 
specificity of the jurisdiction’s statutory and regulatory scheme.114  Thus, as 
statutes and school district policies become more specific about what 
procedures must be followed either to prevent or respond to bullying, the 
less likely it is that an educator’s actions are discretionary and the less 
likely that the educator is immune from suit.115 
 
 109. See Chisolm, 658 S.E.2d at 151; see also infra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
 110. See, e.g., Albers, 806 N.E.2d at 673–74 (explaining that Illinois’s Tort Immunity Act 
grants broad immunity and, in order to bypass immunity, the legislature must statutorily 
make an exception to the Tort Immunity Act); Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. 
Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43, 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (interpreting the Missouri Human Rights Act 
to explicitly impose liability). 
 111. See Albers, 806 N.E.2d at 673–74; Doe ex rel. Subia, 372 S.W.3d at 51. 
 112. Silano, 52 Conn. Supp. at 56–58 (interpreting a statute governing school buses to 
explicitly deny sovereign immunity, falling under the second recognized exception). 
 113. See Comuntzis v. Pinellas Cnty. Sch. Bd., 508 So. 2d 750, 751–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987) (explaining, in a failure to supervise case, that a school’s decision about where to 
place supervisors within the school is discretionary, but a failure to place any supervising 
teachers anywhere in the school is not); Moore v. Hous. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 358 S.W.3d 
612, 615–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (providing examples of a nursing home that fails to 
follow preexisting guidelines for a patient with a history of violence or a school failing to 
implement an early dismissal policy); see also Florence v. L.P., Nos. 2010 CA 000003 MR, 
2010 CA 000004 MR, 2012 WL 162699, at *2–4 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2012). See generally 
57 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 93, §§ 75, 76 (“A legal duty sufficient to render government 
activity merely ministerial for purposes of tort liability may not involve broad discretion but 
instead must reflect prior legislative determinations of policy, leaving only particular aspects 
of implementation to the state’s agents or employees.  Thus, where a political entity adopts a 
specific mandatory set of guidelines for its officers to use with respect to particular activities 
or functions, leaving no discretion to the officers, a grant of discretionary-function immunity 
does not apply.  A mandatory guideline leaves little to no room for individual decision-
making, exercise of judgment, or use of skill.” (citations omitted)). 
 114. Compare Albers, 806 N.E.2d at 675 (explaining that the way a principal handles an 
incidence of bullying is usually discretionary since a principal must make a policy decision 
by balancing competing interests, such as confidentiality of information and the appropriate 
level of punishment), with Moore, 358 S.W.3d at 617–18 (finding that a school’s failure to 
follow a clearly laid out points system to determine the degree of discipline was not a 
discretionary act and, therefore, sovereign immunity did not apply). 
 115. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
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3.  Breach of Duty 
If a plaintiff can establish that the defendant owed a duty of care and has 
no immunity from suit, a breach of duty must next be established.116  A 
breach occurs where the defendant fails to conform to the required standard 
of care.117  For example, if the defendant owes a duty of reasonable care, he 
breaches that standard by engaging in conduct that is unreasonably risky.118 
The standard of ordinary or reasonable care is a default rule, applied in 
the absence of more specific standards of care addressed to the parties or 
the particular situation.119  This standard is generally articulated as the duty 
to exercise the care that would be exercised by a reasonable and prudent 
person under the same or similar circumstances to avoid or minimize the 
risk of harm to others.120 
Statutes may impose a different, more specific kind of duty, however, 
and, as a result, the defendant may be evaluated by a different standard of 
care.121  Under these statutes, some courts allow the plaintiff to prove 
breach merely by showing that the statute was violated, while others use the 
statutory violation as evidence of breach.122  A statute may impose special 
liability on a school for duties that go beyond what common law negligence 
principles might require.123  It might also overcome a general grant of 
qualified immunity.124  Sometimes, a court is confronted with a statute that 
has yet to be interpreted with respect to whether or not it creates a private 
right of action, overrides sovereign immunity, and potentially creates a 
broader conception of duty or higher standard of care than traditional 
negligence.125  In such a case, the court will attempt to discern the intent of 
the legislature.126  While state statutes often include explicit provisions 
 
 116. See generally DOBBS, supra note 90, § 115, at 270; KEETON, supra note 86, § 30, at 
164. 
 117. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 118. See DOBBS, supra note 90, § 115, at 270. 
 119. See id. at 277. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. at 311–12. 
 122. See id. at 312–17. 
 123. See Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43, 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2012); see also Silano v. Bd. of Educ., 52 Conn. Supp. 42, 53 (Super. Ct. 2011). 
 124. See, e.g., Silano, 52 Conn. Supp. at 56; cf. Parsons v. Town of Tewksbury, 26 Mass. 
L. Rptr. 555, at *5–6 (Super. Ct. 2010) (suggesting that a claim under the constitution of 
Massachusetts would overcome sovereign immunity under the Massachusetts Tort Claims 
Act since a state cannot legislatively deprive its citizens of constitutional rights). 
 125. See, e.g., L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 
546–47 (N.J. 2007) (holding that New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination permits a 
private action against a school district for failing to reasonably address a continuing pattern 
of discrimination). But see, e.g., Chisolm v. Tippens, 658 S.E.2d 147, 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2008) (holding that violation of a penal statute does not automatically create a private cause 
of action). 
 126. See Doe ex rel. Subia, 372 S.W.3d at 47 (explaining that determining the intent of 
the legislature is the primary goal of statutory construction). 
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regarding liability,127 a court may also determine that liability was 
implicitly intended by the legislature.128 
4.  Causation in the School Bullying Context 
Before liability for any harm suffered can attach to a particular actor, it 
must be determined that that actor “caused” the harm.129  An act or 
omission is not the legal cause of harm if the harm would have occurred 
without it.130  Since injuries and accidents often result from a complicated 
series of events and “causes,” this can be difficult to determine.131  
Philosophically, the consequences of one’s actions go on into eternity and, 
thus, figuring out if a person “caused” the injury in question and should be 
legally responsible is essentially a line-drawing policy exercise with which 
courts and juries have struggled and continue to struggle.132 
As such, courts have formulated different tests to determine causation.133  
The two most common are the but-for test, which asks if the harm would 
not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s conduct, and the substantial-
factor test, which asks if a defendant’s conduct was a material element and 
 
 127. See Dornfried v. Berlin Bd. of Educ., No. CV064011497S, 2008 WL 5220639, at *9 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2008) (“The weight of [Connecticut] authority holds that when 
the legislature intends to create a new cause of action it does so explicitly in the statute 
itself.”); see also Silano, 52 Conn. Supp. at 56 (holding that a state “schoolbus statute” 
explicitly denied the sovereign immunity defense); Doe ex rel. Subia, 372 S.W.3d at 51 
(holding that an antidiscrimination statute explicitly imposed liability for both direct and 
indirect discrimination). 
 128. See, e.g., Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d at 546–47 (finding that the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination created a private cause of action after looking at the 
language of the act and, primarily, its “remedial” purpose); cf. Dornfried, 2008 WL 
5220639, at *9–10 (holding that the Connecticut antibullying statute did not create a private 
cause of action against public schools because the legislative history showed an aversion to 
exposing public schools to suit). See generally 57 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 93, § 75. 
 129. See KEETON, supra note 86, at 263. But see JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. 
SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:  RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 209 (2004) 
(explaining that “[e]ven when a careless act causes injury, liability often will not attach if the 
injury comes about in an entirely haphazard or otherwise attenuated manner”). 
 130. See KEETON, supra note 86, at 265. 
 131. See GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, supra note 129, at 210; see also KEETON, supra 
note 86, at 263–64. 
 132. See GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, supra note 129, at 212 (giving the example of 
parents who give birth to child X in some attenuated, nonblaming sense “causing” a future 
car accident between X and Y).  The complications of line drawing in causation and its 
relationship to duty and foreseeability are fascinating but are outside the scope of this Note.  
For more, see Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (exemplifying the 
larger debate over the proper roles of foreseeability, duty, and causation in determining 
liability). Compare In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560, 571–72, 577 (finding that the 
unforeseeability of workers’ carelessness causing a wood plank to fall and ignite an 
explosion did not exempt the workers from liability since the plank falling “directly caused” 
the explosion), with Overseas Tankership (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The 
Wagon Mound), [1961] A.C. 388, 393–98 (P.C.) (Austl.) (concluding that Polemis should no 
longer be good law because it would be unjust to hold an actor liable for consequences that 
were unforeseeable). 
 133. See KEETON, supra note 86, at 265–68. 
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a “substantial factor” in bringing about the harm.134  The two tests almost 
always yield the same result, except in the rare instance where one or more 
actions, each of which would cause the harm suffered in its entirety, 
simultaneously cause the harm.135 
In cases where a student is bullied and the school or its personnel are 
sued, the causation question often turns on whether the injury suffered was 
foreseeable by the school and on how much the school’s act or omission 
contributed to the harm.136  Foreseeability is often measured by whether or 
not school employees knew or should have known that the harm the student 
suffered would occur.  Thus, if a school administrator has actual knowledge 
that severe bullying of a student has been occurring in school and fails to 
take reasonable steps to address it, some courts will allow a jury to 
determine whether and how much this inaction “caused” the harm.137 
C.  The Rise of Cyberbullying and Its Unique Regulatory Challenges 
While thus far this Note has primarily focused on traditional bullying and 
the liability problems it presents for schools, the same basic principles of 
liability apply for cyberbullying.  Cyberbullying, as a problem in its own 
right, is explored in the next section before turning to recently enacted 
cyberbullying legislation and schools’ duty to police cyberbullying.138 
The past several decades have seen an explosion of modern 
communication technology.139  In 2007, an estimated 45 million children 
 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 266–68.  The most commonly cited example of this occurrence is from 
Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., where two fires from two different sources 
combined to burn the plaintiff’s property, each of which might have accomplished this alone. 
See Cook, 74 N.W. 561, 561 (Wis. 1898). 
 136. See, e.g., M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 681 
(Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that foreseeability does not focus on the particular aggressor but 
rather the foreseeable risk of a particular type of harm—sometimes, the court will weigh the 
risk of the harm and the activity or burden needed to prevent the harm); Jasperson v. Anoka-
Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. A06-1904, 2007 WL 3153456, at *5–7 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 30, 2007) (finding that the causation element of negligence was not proven 
because the bullied student’s suicide was not foreseeable, and it was not clear that the 
nonexistence of a school bullying policy was a legal cause of the harm); see also Moore v. 
Hous. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 358 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (“It isn’t necessary to 
predict the exact mechanism of the injury or even its extent if the general mechanism of 
injury is reasonably foreseeable.  So the Houston County Board of Education is negligent.”). 
 137. See, e.g., L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 
549–51 (N.J. 2007) (finding that while a school cannot protect against all instances of peer 
harassment, it must take reasonable measures, and the factfinders must determine the 
reasonableness of the school’s response in light of the totality of the circumstances); Burns 
v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 641–42, 647 (Va. 2012) (finding that, where an assistant 
principal had notice that a physical confrontation would occur that day but did not act, the 
question of negligence could be sent to the jury); see also Bell v. Ayio, 731 So. 2d 893, 895, 
903 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding a jury’s determination that where a bus driver kicked 
two fighting students off the bus and left them unsupervised to continue fighting, the driver 
was 15 percent liable for the resulting injuries). 
 138. See infra Part II.A.1–3. 
 139. See Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 148; see also Jamie Wolf, Note, The 
Playground Bully Has Gone Digital:  The Dangers of Cyberbullying, the First Amendment 
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between the ages of ten and seventeen used the internet daily.140  In 2010, 
an estimated 50.1 percent of children between ten and eighteen used 
Facebook regularly during a given week, and 40.7 percent used instant 
messaging programs.141  Cell phones are even more pervasive—in 2010, 83 
percent of adolescents between ten and eighteen used cell phones 
regularly.142  In the school context, this means that students increasingly 
interact with each other off campus, and these interactions have 
implications for the performance and operation of the school.143 
While technologies such as cell phones and social media have undeniable 
benefits, they have also allowed bullies to “extend the reach of their 
aggression” beyond traditional physical settings to become 
“cyberbullies.”144  Justin W. Patchin and Sameer Hinduja, two recognized 
experts in the study of cyberbullying, define cyberbullying as “when 
someone repeatedly harasses, mistreats, or makes fun of another person 
online or while using cell phones or other electronic devices.”145  Because 
of technology’s pervasiveness and ease of use, along with other factors 
discussed below, the number of cyberbullying incidents has risen 
disproportionately when compared to instances of traditional bullying.146 
While traditional bullying and cyberbullying are both serious issues, 
cyberbullying can present more complicated social and regulatory 
problems.  Importantly, it can take place from anywhere and at any time.147  
This ubiquity yields several problematic results.  First, cyberbullying is 
almost inescapable—victims are often tormented through cell phones, the 
internet, and by other electronic forms that render them accessible at all 
times and places.148  As internet safety expert and privacy lawyer Parry 
Aftab stated, “The schoolyard bullies beat you up and then go home. . . .  
 
Implications, and the Necessary Responses, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 575 
(2012). 
 140. Kirk R. Williams & Nancy G. Guerra, Prevalence and Predictors of Internet 
Bullying, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S14, S15 (2007). 
 141. See Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Teens Use of Technology:  Weekly 
Activities (10 to 18-Year-Olds), CYBERBULLYING RES. CENTER (2010), http://www.cyber
bullying.us/2010_charts/teen_tech_use_2010.jpg. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 144. Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 148; see also Wolf, supra note 139. 
 145. Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Research, CYBERBULLYING RES. CENTER, 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/research.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 146. See Williams & Guerra, supra note 140, at S15; see also Jamison Barr & Emmy 
Lugus, Digital Threats on Campus:  Examining the Duty of Colleges To Protect Their Social 
Networking Students, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 757, 765–66 (2011) (highlighting the spread 
of technological bullying by noting that “cyberbullying” and “cyberstalking” have become 
part of the American lexicon); cf. Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 152 (pointing out 
that, while there has been a “transmutation” in traditional bullying, the general frequency of 
cyberbullying is still unclear due to a general lack of research). 
 147. See Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 154–55. 
 148. Id. at 155. 
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The cyberbullies beat you up at home, at grandma’s house, whereever [sic] 
you’re connected to technology.”149 
Second, and perhaps most important in the legal context, there is little 
supervision or oversight of the electronic forms used to cyberbully.150  This 
lack of oversight coupled with little accountability means that cyberbullies 
can remain largely anonymous and disregard consequences, creating a 
scenario where a person who is not normally confrontational can behave as 
such without readily exposing his or her identity.151  The anonymity, 
disconnect from consequences, and lack of any formal boundaries or 
oversight can tempt adolescents who are normally respectful in face-to-face 
interactions to engage in highly negative technological discourse.152  There 
is even evidence that adolescents become desensitized as digital forms of 
communication become more popular and come to view this negative form 
of discourse as normal.153 
Additionally, cyberbullying has the potential to garner a wider audience 
and can do so within mere minutes.154  Moreover, as information spreads on 
the internet, it often becomes permanent—a fact that many adolescents do 
not realize when posting something online.155  Practically speaking, these 
factors mean potentially more widespread and longer-lasting harm to the 
victim.156 
All these factors are cause for concern, and they can be particularly 
problematic for educators; although cyberbullying starts out in the virtual 
world, it often has psychologically devastating and socially detrimental 
consequences in the physical world.157  It can create a hostile school 
environment where students do not feel comfortable or safe, and there is no 
 
 149. Yunji De Nies, Susan Donaldson James & Sarah Netter, Mean Girls:  Cyberbullying 
Blamed for Teen Suicides, ABC GOOD MORNING AM. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go
.com/GMA/Parenting/girls-teen-suicide-calls-attention-cyberbullying/story?id=9685026 
(quoting Parry Aftab). 
 150. See Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 154; Shaheen Shariff & Dianne L. Hoff, 
Cyber Bullying:  Clarifying Legal Boundaries for School Supervision in Cyberspace, 1 INT’L 
J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 76, 78–83 (2007).  While outside the scope of this Note, many 
scholars have argued for greater Internet Service Provider (ISP) accountability. See, e.g., id. 
at 78 (“American legislation . . . protects technology corporations at the expense of victims 
of cyber-targeting, defamation and harassment.”); see also Charlotte Chang, Note, Internet 
Safety Survey:  Who Will Protect the Children?, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 521–23 
(2010). 
 151. See Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 154. 
 152. See Shariff & Hoff, supra note 150, at 83 (“Young people in cyber-space lose their 
inhibitions in the absence of no central power, clear institutional or familial boundaries, or 
hierarchical structures.”). 
 153. See Barr & Lugus, supra note 146, at 768. 
 154. See Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 39, at 154–55; see also Barr & Lugus, supra note 
146, at 762–67 (examining several instances of college students being either physically or 
reputationally damaged by information going viral). 
 155. See Barr & Lugus, supra note 146, at 761–62. 
 156. See, e.g., id. at 767 (providing an anecdote about one college “gossip” website that 
could spread rumors to over 500 colleges). 
 157. See Shariff & Hoff, supra note 150, at 83. 
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longer equal opportunity to learn.158  Additionally, bullying in the virtual 
world often results in physical confrontation, which tends to take place in 
school.159  Schools are enormous stakeholders in maintaining order in the 
school environment, teaching students acceptable ways of interacting, and 
providing students with an optimal learning environment.160  For all these 
reasons, not to mention a fundamental desire to protect students, a school 
may wish to regulate off-campus speech.161 
D.  The U.S. Supreme Court and Student Speech 
A school’s desire to regulate its students’ speech is often in tension with 
the First Amendment, but never more so than in a case of off-campus 
speech.  While the U.S. Supreme Court has never heard a case involving 
school regulation of off-campus, non-school-related speech, courts look to 
four seminal cases for student speech jurisprudence, explored in this 
section.  First, this section examines the touchstone of student free speech 
rights, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.162  It 
then looks at the Supreme Court’s standard for exceptionally vulgar speech 
in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser163 and the Court’s handling of 
school-endorsed speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.164  
Lastly, it assesses off-campus speech at a school-sponsored event in Morse 
v. Frederick.165 
1.  Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
In Tinker, a group of adults and high school students met and decided to 
voice their objections to the war in Vietnam by wearing black armbands.166  
The principals of the Des Moines schools learned of this plan and adopted a 
policy that students would be asked to remove their armbands, and failure 
to do so would result in suspension.167  Three students, John Tinker, 
Christopher Eckhardt, and Mary Beth Eckhardt, wore their armbands to 
school and were suspended.168  They subsequently brought a claim against 
the school asserting that the disciplinary action violated their First 
Amendment rights.169 
 
 158. See id. at 84. 
 159. See id.; see also Beckstrom, supra note 60, at 286–87 (detailing examples from 
focus group studies of cyberbullying that results in tangible effects in the physical school 
environment). 
 160. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 161. See id. at 79–84. 
 162. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 163. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 164. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 165. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 166. 393 U.S. at 504. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 504–05. 
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The Court first reasoned that students do not “shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”170  On 
the other hand, it also explained that conduct by a student that “materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights 
of others is . . . not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
speech”171 and that school administrators have a justified interest in seeking 
to prevent this type of expression.172  Attempting to balance these 
competing interests, the Court set forth a standard that has endured:  student 
speech may not be restricted unless it is reasonably foreseeable that this 
speech could cause a material and substantial disruption at school.173  The 
students’ speech in Tinker did not rise to this level.174 
2.  Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
In Bethel, a high school student in Pierce County, Washington, named 
Fraser delivered a speech nominating a peer for student government in 
which he used an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”175  
The next morning, Fraser was suspended for having violated a Bethel High 
School disciplinary rule stating, “Conduct which materially and 
substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including 
the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”176  After these 
disciplinary measures were upheld in administrative proceedings, Fraser 
brought a claim alleging a First Amendment violation.177 
Upholding the school’s response, the Court explained, “The undoubted 
freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and 
classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in 
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”178  It 
explained that the constitutional rights of students in schools are not 
“coextensive” with those of adults elsewhere.179  It concluded by holding 
that the First Amendment does not prevent school officials from restricting 
vulgar and lewd speech in school that would undermine a school’s 
educational mission.180 
 
 170. Id. at 506. 
 171. Id. at 513. 
 172. Id. at 507–08. 
 173. Id. at 514. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986). 
 176. Id. at 678. 
 177. Id. at 678–79. 
 178. Id. at 681; see also id. at 683 (“Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public 
school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. . . . 
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, 
the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a 
civilized social order.  Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—
demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct 
and deportment in and out of class.”). 
 179. Id. at 682. 
 180. Id. at 685. 
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3.  Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
Kuhlmeier involved student speech in the context of a high school 
newspaper.181  The newspaper was funded mostly by the school board, and 
it was customary for the editor to send proofs to the principal before 
publication.182  On one occasion, the principal thought two stories should 
not be published—one story detailed the experiences of three students who 
were pregnant, and one was about being a child of divorced parents and 
contained personal quotes from students.183  The principal informed the 
editor that either the school would print the issue without the pages on 
which the stories appeared or there would be no issue at all.184 
The Court distinguished this case from Tinker on the grounds that Tinker 
dealt with a school’s tolerance of student speech, whereas Kuhlmeier dealt 
with a school’s promotion of student speech.185  This distinction was rooted 
in the facts that the vehicle of expression was a school newspaper, 
published as part of the school curriculum and largely controlled by the 
school, and designed as part of the students’ training.186  Ultimately, the 
Court held that educators do not violate the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over school-sponsored speech so long as the editing is 
reasonably related to pedagogical concerns.187 
4.  Morse v. Frederick 
In Morse, a high school student arrived at a school-sponsored trip to 
watch the Olympic torch parade and unfurled a large banner that read, 
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”188  Upon noticing the banner, the principal 
instructed the surrounding students to take the banner down, but Joseph 
Frederick refused.189  Consequently, Principal Morse called Frederick into 
her office and suspended him for ten days under the school district’s policy 
that students may not advocate for the use of illegal drugs.190  The school 
superintendent upheld the decision but limited the suspension to eight 
days.191 
The Court first emphasized that this was school speech despite the fact 
that it took place off campus; the speech took place during school hours, at 
a school-sponsored activity, and among teachers and students.192  It did 
acknowledge, however, that there is some “uncertainty at the outer 
 
 181. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988). 
 182. Id. at 262–63. 
 183. Id. at 263. 
 184. Id. at 264. 
 185. Id. at 270–71 (also finding that a school newspaper is not, in fact, a “public forum”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 273. 
 188. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 189. Id. at 398. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 398–99. 
 192. Id. at 400–01. 
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boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech precedents.”193  
Next, the Court attempted to glean some coherent standard from Fraser and 
Kuhlmeier in the wake of Tinker.194  The majority drew two basic 
principles from the school speech line of cases:  (1) that students do not 
have the same free speech rights in school as adults have outside of school; 
and (2) that the Tinker mode of analysis is not absolute.195  Ultimately, the 
Court found that a principal does not violate the First Amendment by 
restricting speech that is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug 
use.196 
II.  LEGISLATURES AND COURTS DISAGREE ON HOW 
TO REGULATE CYBERBULLYING 
As the number of cyberbullying incidents in schools has increased, state 
legislatures have enacted more aggressive legislation and generally seem to 
be expanding the scope of schools’ regulatory authority off campus.197  On 
the other hand, courts have been protective of students’ First Amendment 
rights when attempting to apply minimal Supreme Court and circuit court 
precedent to novel technological situations in the cyberbullying context.198  
Part II.A examines the range of state legislative responses to the emerging 
cyberbullying problem in schools and details the new responsibilities that 
schools may face under these laws.  Part II.B surveys how lower courts 
have applied existing legal precedent to schools’ off-campus regulatory 
authority.  Part II.C synthesizes the two previous parts, highlighting a 
situation where schools may face liability from both cyberbullies and 
victims no matter what type of responsive action they take. 
 
 193. Id. at 401. 
 194. Id. at 403–06. 
 195. Id. at 404–05.  The majority places great weight on the student’s free speech rights 
being limited as a result of being in the school environment. Id.  Additionally, it clearly does 
not think highly of the analytical framework employed in Fraser. Id. (“Whatever approach 
Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed 
by Tinker.” (citation omitted)). 
 196. Id. at 409–10.  The Court declined to adopt the school’s view that Frederick’s speech 
was “offensive” and therefore fell under the Fraser exception, and instead strongly 
emphasized the government and school’s important interest in curbing drug use. Id. at 407–
10. 
 197. See Beckstrom, supra note 60, at 283–86 (adding that state legislation is “disparate 
in its sensitivity toward students’ free speech rights”); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18A:37-13.1 (West Supp. 2012). 
 198. See Trainor, supra note 41; Erb, supra note 40, at 271 (noting that courts have 
generally been protective of free speech even if it is vulgar, cruel, sexually explicit, or 
threatening); see also Amy Benfer, Cyber Slammed, SALON (July 3, 2001), http://www.salon
.com/2001/07/03/cyber_bullies/ (observing that even the most vulgar and abhorrent off-
campus speech has been seen as “out of the legal reach” of schools and courts). 
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A.  State Legislative Responses to Cyberbullying and 
Potential New Duties for Schools 
This section looks at various states’ efforts to combat cyberbullying 
through legislation.  It depicts the collective response of lawmakers to 
cyberbullying.  This section next outlines the various approaches states 
have taken in giving schools authority to regulate off-campus speech.  
Finally, it examines recent legislation to assess what new responsibilities it 
may impose on school districts and schools. 
1.  A Rush To Codify Cyberbullying 
Similar to traditional bullying, several violent incidents of cyberbullying 
in the last decade grabbed national headlines and prompted a public outcry 
for government action.199  Despite the debate within the judiciary over the 
appropriate reach of school authority,200 several states have pushed ahead 
with aggressive anticyberbullying legislation.201  Other states have either 
left their statutory schemes alone or made an attempt to slightly modify the 
existing framework.202  In addition, the federal government unsuccessfully 
attempted to pass legislation that would strengthen efforts to combat 
cyberbullying and make standards more cohesive across states.203  The state 
legislatures, though, have proven to be true “laboratories for 
experimentation,”204 resulting in a complex, varied spectrum of state 
statutory schemes.205 
2.  Legislative Approaches To Incorporate Cyberbullying into State Statutes 
One group of states has either no cyberbullying legislation or very 
limited electronic bullying language.  Three states—Alaska, Montana, and 
Wisconsin—have not incorporated electronic means of bullying into school 
 
 199. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 200. See infra Part II.B. 
 201. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 202. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 203. See Meredith, supra note 32, at 326–31, 334–37 (discussing the federal Megan 
Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, which did not pass, and several other pieces of 
proposed legislation which focused more on educating students about internet safety as 
opposed to regulating cyberbullying); see also Chang, supra note 150, at 523–24 
(questioning the constitutionality of the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act and 
describing it as “untenable and potentially constitutionally vague”); cf. FCC Taking on 
Cyberbullying in Schools, FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/
2010/10/29/fcc-taking-cyberbullying-schools/ (discussing the FCC’s plan to mandate 
internet safety education, including cyberbullying, for schools that receive internet access 
subsidies). 
 204. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 205. See Beckstrom, supra note 60, at 291–96.  For a comprehensive survey of all states’ 
bullying and cyberbullying laws as of January 2013 categorized by features, see Hinduja & 
Patchin, supra note 71. 
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bullying or harassment laws in any way.206  This approach is unusual, 
however, as many states incorporate at least some form of electronic 
bullying into state laws, even if a school’s authority to regulate is limited to 
cyberbullying that occurs on school property or is perpetrated with school 
property—for example, on the school’s internet network or computers.207 
A second category of states has passed more expansive legislation.208  
States in this category have explicitly made an effort to incorporate off-
campus cyberbullying into a school’s regulatory ambit.209  Many of these 
states implement the “reasonably foreseeable to cause a substantial and 
material disruption at school” language from Tinker directly into their 
 
 206. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.250 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-101 (2011); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 118.46 (West Supp. 2012). See generally Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 71.  
Montana, of course, has no school bullying laws at all. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-101. 
 207. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-4(a), 16-28B-3(2) (LexisNexis 2012) (prohibiting 
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to, written, electronic, verbal, or physical acts that are reasonably perceived as being 
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individual who has a particular characteristic” (emphasis added)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
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electronic, or verbal communications, or any physical act or any threatening communication, 
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CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(r)–(s) (West Supp. 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(1)(b) 
(2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 
Supp. 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4(a) (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (Supp. 
2011); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-23.7 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-8-13.5 
(LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 
(Supp. 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.070(1)(f) (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6554 (Supp. 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1310b (West Supp. 
2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.0695 (West Supp. 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-67 
(West Supp. 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775 (West Supp. 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-
2,137 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.135 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 15.1-19-17 (Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (LexisNexis Supp. 
2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-100.3 (Supp. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.351 
(West Supp. 2012); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West Supp. 2012); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 16-21-33, -34 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-63-120, -140 (Supp. 2011); TEX. 
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0832 (West Supp. 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11a-301 
(LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 28A.300.285 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-3 (LexisNexis 2012); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-4-312 (2011). See generally Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 71 (finding thirty-four 
states that have incorporated electronic bullying or harassment into state law but limit 
regulatory authority to a school’s campus or property). 
 208. See generally Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 71 (documenting ten states and the 
District of Columbia that have included off-campus activity in some form or another in 
bullying or cyberbullying laws). 
 209. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (Supp. 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d 
(West Supp. 2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West Supp. 2012); 
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 11(7) (McKinney Supp. 2012) (effective July 1, 2013); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 13-32-15 (2002 & Supp. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1015 (West 2012); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11(32) (Supp. 2012); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-B § B2599 (2012) 
(“bullying” and “harassment”); see also Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 71. 
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bullying or cyberbullying statutes.210  The direction that legislatures have 
given school districts varies—some states merely direct that school districts 
create a cyberbullying policy,211 while others detail precisely what 
electronic activity is prohibited and how school employees must report and 
discipline cyberbullies.212 
Many states have also mandated additional requirements on the part of 
either schools or school districts.  One common feature of new bullying and 
cyberbullying statutes is a “character education” program, whereby schools 
must educate students about the dangers of cyberbullying.213  Another 
common requirement is mandated professional development for teachers 
and administrators on how to recognize cyberbullying, its effects, and the 
appropriate action to take.214  Additionally, many states have recently 
imposed reporting requirements, mandating that administrators report 
bullying instances to the school district for greater informational 
transparency.215  While there are a handful of other statutory requirements 
from state to state, these are the most common. 
3.  New Responsibilities for School Districts and Personnel 
Depending on the state and statutory language, school districts, schools, 
and school employees may be charged with various new responsibilities, 
 
 210. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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paraprofessionals, to prevent, identify and respond to bullying. The content of such 
professional development shall include, but not be limited to:  (i) developmentally 
appropriate strategies to prevent bullying incidents; (ii) developmentally appropriate 
strategies for immediate, effective interventions to stop bullying incidents; (iii) information 
regarding the complex interaction and power differential that can take place between and 
among a perpetrator, victim and witnesses to the bullying; (iv) research findings on bullying, 
including information about specific categories of students who have been shown to be 
particularly at risk for bullying in the school environment; (v) information on the incidence 
and nature of cyber-bullying; and (vi) internet safety issues as they relate to cyber-
bullying”).  Similarly to character education programs, some states mandate that state and 
local school boards develop workshops or programs for employees but do not yet mandate 
their implementation in schools. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-145(b) (2012). 
 215. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4(f)–(h) (LexisNexis 2011). 
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legal or otherwise.216  For some schools, this will mean making sure there is 
a cyberbullying policy in place.217  For teachers and administrators, it may 
mean keeping accurate records of cyberbullying incidents and reporting this 
data.218  Still others will be required to develop and implement educational 
programs for school staff and students.219 
The new, unresolved issue that remains, however, is whether schools will 
be charged with a legal duty to implement these measures in order to 
protect students from cyberbullying by other students.220  While some 
courts have engaged in lengthy statutory interpretation of older bullying and 
harassment laws,221 the wave of new legislation to combat cyberbullying 
has, for the most part, been untouched by courts.222  This is because all of 
the courts that have decided cyberbullying cases have done so in the context 
of a plaintiff bringing a claim that a school violated his or her free speech 
rights through its cyberbullying discipline.223  A student or parent has yet to 
 
 216. See Beckstrom, supra note 60, at 311 (pointing out that school responsibility and 
authority vary widely from state to state in the wake of new legislation). Compare MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O(c)–(d) (requiring schools to implement bullying character 
education programming for students and professional development for school staff), with VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 570 (mandating that school districts create antibullying policies). 
 217. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 570. 
 218. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4. 
 219. See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-13.3 (West 2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
71, § 37O(c)–(d). 
 220. See Trainor, supra note 41, at 1 (“Most agree that, as U.S. Secretary of Education 
Arne Duncan and President Obama point out, [bullying] is not an acceptable rite of passage 
for children.  What remains unclear is the extent to which schools and their officials should 
be held accountable for the harm that bullying causes, and to what degree the First 
Amendment allows school districts to regulate what students say to one another.”); see also 
Beckstrom, supra note 60, at 309–11 (arguing that cyberbullying legislation has only 
magnified schools’ confusion about their duties to protect students); Séamus P. Boyce & 
Andrew A. Manna, School Liability for Bullying and Harassment, LEADERSHIP INSIDER, 
Aug. 2011, at 1–3 (noting that while peer harassment liability is “not new,” courts may 
become less likely to award qualified immunity to schools and staff as bullying statutes 
become more detailed in their procedural requirements, thereby making educators’ responses 
less discretionary); cf. Barr & Lugus, supra note 146, at 771 (noting that while courts have 
imposed legal duties on colleges in cases such as fraternity hazing, sexual assaults by third 
parties, and university-sponsored safe ride programs, they have yet to consider a college’s 
duty to monitor social networking among students). 
 221. See, e.g., Dornfried v. Berlin Bd. of Educ., No. CV064011497S, 2008 WL 5220639, 
at *9–10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2008) (interpreting Connecticut’s antibullying statute 
and determining that it does not create a private right of action and, therefore, a school does 
not owe a legal duty to the individual student); L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. 
Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 546–47 (N.J. 2007) (interpreting the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination to impose a duty on schools to reasonably address an individual student’s 
repeated complaints of discriminatory bullying); see also Moore v. Hous. Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 358 S.W.3d 612, 617–18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (interpreting antibullying statute to 
determine whether an administrator’s actions were discretionary). 
 222. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Darcy K. Lane, Note, Taking the Lead on Cyberbullying:  Why Schools Can and 
Should Protect Students Online, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1794 (2011) (observing that most 
case law regarding off-campus cyber-speech results from a First Amendment challenge to 
school discipline after a student targets a teacher or administrator).  Lane also emphasizes 
the important differences between a student targeting a faculty member and a student 
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bring a claim under a new cyberbullying law stating that a school failed to 
protect that student from electronic bullying, so it is unclear whether these 
statutes will be interpreted to impose new legal duties on schools.224  
Nevertheless, it would be no surprise to see suits of this type brought in the 
near future; several scholars note the rise of legal complaints against 
schools in the last decade due to increased awareness of bullying.225 
Additionally, there are indications that courts might be willing to find 
that a school has a legal duty to protect students from cyberbullying in some 
states.  To engage in some statutory interpretation, the language of certain 
states’ antibullying statutes may imply an individual’s right to bring suit 
and that liability may attach to a school employee’s failure to act on 
knowledge that cyberbullying is occurring or has occurred.226  Additionally, 
several states explicitly grant immunity from liability to school officials 
who report or respond to instances of cyberbullying, implying that those 
 
targeting another student. Id. at 1809–11. But see Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 
565, 567–69 (4th Cir. 2011) (involving a group of students bullying another student on 
MySpace.com); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1098–99 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (involving students gossiping and demeaning another student on 
camera and posting the video to YouTube.com); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 791, 795–96 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (involving a student creating a website entitled 
“losers” with pictures of three classmates and a few insulting sentences about each). 
 224. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Trainor, supra note 41, at 1 (finding that between June 2010 and June 2011, 
there were at least eighteen different bullying actions against school districts either filed or 
decided, and these were only the cases that received press coverage and were probably just 
the “tip of the iceberg”); see also Boyce & Manna, supra note 220, at 1, 3 (pointing out that 
although claims against schools under antibullying laws have not been very successful, “we 
do not see the effort waning”). 
 226. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(d) (Supp. 2011) (stating that “[a] school 
principal or his or her designee who receives a credible report or complaint of bullying shall 
promptly investigate the complaint or report and make a record of the investigation and any 
action taken as a result of the investigation,” where “bullying” includes off-campus, 
electronic activity (emphasis added)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1016(d) (West 2012) (same, 
but requiring either actual physical harm or threat of physical harm); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18A:37-16(d) (West Supp. 2012) (“A school administrator who receives a report of 
harassment, intimidation, or bullying from a district employee, and fails to initiate or conduct 
an investigation, or who should have known of an incident of harassment, intimidation, or 
bullying and fails to take sufficient action to minimize or eliminate the harassment, 
intimidation, or bullying, may be subject to disciplinary action.” (emphasis added)); N.Y. 
EDUC. LAW §§ 3023, 3813 (McKinney Supp. 2012) (mandating that school districts 
indemnify local school employees from civil liability, and mandating that such employee 
must be served with notice of a tort claim before such a claim can be brought); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-17 (Supp. 2012) (limiting claims based on this section to those 
against employees in “substantial noncompliance” with district policy). But see D.C. CODE 
§ 2-1535.08 (LexisNexis 2011) (“This subchapter does not create a new private right of 
action or provide a statutory basis for a claim for damages against the District of Columbia 
or its employees.”); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (“Nothing 
in this section shall supersede or replace existing rights or remedies under any other general 
or special law, nor shall this section create a private right of action.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 193-F:9 (LexisNexis 2011) (“[N]or shall this chapter create a private right of action for 
enforcement of this chapter against any school district or chartered public school, or the 
state.”). See generally supra Part I.B.1. 
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who do not could be sued.227  While these are not definitive indicators of 
liability, courts may point to these grants in interpreting new antibullying 
provisions to imply a legal duty.228  Last, some have asserted that courts are 
becoming more sympathetic to plaintiffs’ claims for failure to protect from 
bullying,229 and it is possible that this could extend to cyberbullying. 
B.  Lower Courts’ Application of Student Free Speech Precedent in        
Off-Campus Student Speech Cases 
This section surveys the student free speech landscape after Tinker and 
its progeny.  It examines what standards lower courts have applied to 
students’ off-campus speech and highlights a general trend across courts to 
protect students’ free speech rights off campus. 
1.  Courts Are Unclear on What Standard To Apply and How To Apply It 
In the wake of Morse, courts are left with essentially four different 
precedents for schools attempting to regulate student speech.230  None of 
these Supreme Court cases dealt with off-campus, non-school-sponsored 
speech, however, and the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue.231  
In fact, the Supreme Court has denied several petitions for certiorari, 
 
 227. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(g) (2007 & Supp. 2011) (“A school employee 
who has reported violations under the school district’s policy shall be immune from any tort 
liability that may arise from the failure to remedy the reported incident.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-222l(a)–(c) (West Supp. 2012) (“No claim for damages shall be made against a 
school employee . . . who reports, investigates and responds to bullying . . . if such school 
employee was acting in good faith in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of 
his or her employment. . . .  No claim for damages shall be made against a local or regional 
board of education that implements the safe school climate plan . . . and reports, investigates 
and responds to bullying . . . if such local or regional board of education was acting in good 
faith in the discharge of its duties.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:7 (same); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 18A:37-16 (same); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 16 (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2012) (same); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-17 (same). But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1018 (West 2012) 
(“encouraging,” not mandating, the reporting of known instances of bullying and granting 
immunity for such reporting). 
 228. See generally supra Part I.B.1. 
 229. See Trainor, supra note 41 (using the opinion in T.K. v. N.Y.C. Department of 
Education, 779 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), as an indication that courts might be 
lowering standards to find schools liable for failing to remedy pervasive bullying); see also 
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that schools 
have a duty to protect their students from harassment and bullying in the school 
environment). 
 230. See supra Part I.D. 
 231. Amici Curiae Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 4–5, 
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (No. 11-502), 2011 WL 
5254664; see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 942 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“In fact, the Supreme Court has never addressed 
whether students have the right to make off-campus speech that targets school officials with 
malicious, obscene, and vulgar accusations.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Mickey 
Lee Jett, Note, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate:  The Fate of Tinker in the Age of Digital 
Social Media, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 895, 896–97 (2012) (advocating for the Supreme Court to 
certify a cyberbullying case in order to articulate a new legal standard). 
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including two just this past year.232  Thus, when presented with a potential 
free speech violation, courts must assess which precedent the instant case is 
governed by.233 
At its essence, the analytical starting point for lower courts has been as 
follows:  “(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive [on-campus] 
speech is governed by Fraser;234 (2) school-sponsored speech is governed 
by Hazelwood;235 and (3) speech that falls into neither of these categories is 
governed by Tinker.”236  In most off-campus student speech cases, courts 
have applied the Tinker substantial-effects test.237  Under this test, a court 
will look to whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the student’s off-
campus speech could cause a material and substantial disruption at 
school.238  Nevertheless, significant confusion has caused some courts to 
use either a different standard239 or several standards all at once.240 
 
 232. See Lyle Denniston, Government Prayer Cases Passed Up (FINAL UPDATE), 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2012, 1:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/government-
prayer-cases-passed-up/ (discussing the denial of certiorari to Kowalski v. Berkeley County 
Schools from the Fourth Circuit and Blue Mountain School District v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder 
from the Third Circuit). 
 233. See, e.g., J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1100–04 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (engaging in an extensive analysis of Supreme Court precedent 
and how lower courts have applied these cases to school regulation of off-campus student 
speech). 
 234. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); see also supra Part 
I.D.2. 
 235. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); see also supra Part 
I.D.3. 
 236. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2001); Beverly Hills 
Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (quoting LaVine); see also Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see also supra Part I.D.1. 
 237. See, e.g., Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 571–75 (4th Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder 
v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926–33 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 238. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 239. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(employing the “true threat” test, where speech is not protected by the First Amendment if it 
is “a serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm” (internal quotations 
omitted)); Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 625–26 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(also utilizing the true threat analysis for off-campus student speech).  For the original 
articulation of the true threat doctrine, see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). See 
also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Although some courts 
have assessed a student’s statements concerning the killing of a school official or a fellow 
student against the [Watts true threat standard], we think that school officials have 
significantly broader authority to sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows.  
With respect to school officials’ authority to discipline a student’s expression reasonably 
understood as urging violent conduct, we think the appropriate First Amendment standard is 
the [Tinker standard].” (citations omitted)). 
 240. See Porter, 393 F.3d at 614 (“Uncertain as to the appropriate legal standard . . . , the 
district court employed three different approaches . . . .”); see also Reply Brief at 1, 
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461), 2011 WL 6859435 
(“Over a dozen scholarly articles in the last few years have discussed the lower courts’ 
confusion and the need for guidance from [the Supreme Court].”). 
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In off-campus speech cases, the difficulty has not ended with figuring out 
what standard to apply—for those courts that have employed the Tinker 
substantial-effects test, what constitutes a “substantial effect” and how to 
determine if off-campus speech is reasonably foreseeable to create one has 
proven to be both difficult and divisive.241  As the court noted in J.C. ex rel. 
R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District, 
The substantial disruption inquiry is highly fact-intensive.  Perhaps for 
that reason, existing case law has not provided clear guidelines as to when 
a substantial disruption is reasonably foreseeable.  There is, for example, 
no magic number of students or classrooms that must be affected by the 
speech.  One court has held that a substantial disruption requires 
something more than “a mild distraction or curiosity created by the 
speech” but need not rise to the level of “complete chaos.”  Not 
surprisingly, however, the gulf between those two concepts swallows the 
vast majority of factual scenarios.242 
As a result, courts applying the exact same standard have come to opposite 
conclusions even in strikingly similar cases.243 
2.  A General Judicial Trend Toward Protecting 
Students’ First Amendment Rights 
Both scholars and judges alike have noted the inconsistency of lower 
courts’ student speech jurisprudence.244  In contrast, others have asserted 
that courts have generally favored protecting students’ First Amendment 
rights and have been very cautious about expanding the scope of schools’ 
 
 241. See, e.g., Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 931 (where a divided en banc panel 
held, eight to six, that a student’s creation of a fake website profile with crude content and 
vulgar language did not meet the substantial-effects test); see also Beverly Hills Unified Sch. 
Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1104–07, 1112–15 (discussing different courts’ treatment of the 
origin of the speech, the “sufficient nexus” between the school and the speech, and 
compiling a long list of factors which could be considered in the substantial-effect analysis). 
 242. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1111 (quoting J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. 
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa. 2002)). 
 243. Compare id. at 1108, 1117–22 (finding a First Amendment violation where a school 
disciplined a student for posting and circulating a mocking, derisive YouTube.com video 
about another student), with Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573–74 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (declining to find a First Amendment violation and finding “confidently” that a 
student’s creation of a MySpace.com group to mock and spread rumors about another 
student caused a substantial disruption).  Conflicting results are true of student-teacher 
harassment, as well. Compare Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 208–16 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (finding no substantial disruption and, thus, a First Amendment 
violation where a high school senior created a fake website profile for his principal and three 
other students later did the same in increasingly vulgar and offensive fashion), with 
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36, 39–40 (finding a middle school’s discipline of a student did not 
violate his First Amendment rights where the student created an AOL Instant Messenger 
icon of a cartoon pistol firing a bullet at a cartoon of his English teacher because it was 
reasonably foreseeable to cause a substantial disruption). 
 244. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220–22 (Jordan, J., concurring); see also Blue Mountain 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 943–52 (Fisher, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); 
Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1102–07; Beckstrom, supra note 60, at 
302; Jett, supra note 231, at 917–19. 
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regulatory authority.245  At least one court and one scholar have discussed 
the high evidentiary standard and level of difficulty of offering “proof” that 
a school environment might be disturbed if speech had been left 
unregulated.246  Due to the difficulty of proving hypothetical disruption in 
the future, as well as the division over what constitutes a substantial 
disruption, schools have generally failed to justify their off-campus 
regulation.247 
C.  Schools and Educators Are Receiving Mixed Messages About 
Their Proper Role in Policing Cyberbullying 
To a school district superintendent, principal, teacher, or any other 
educator, the current legal landscape of cyberbullying could be highly 
confusing.248  When educators in schools respond to conflict, they 
consciously and subconsciously draw from a multitude of sources, such as 
personal and social values, concern for students, and the rules and 
expectations of the school system in their districts and individual 
schools.249  When school districts craft policies, they also draw from a 
 
 245. See Beckstrom, supra note 60, at 309 (asserting that the plain language of the Tinker 
standard might give schools broader regulatory authority than courts have been willing to 
grant); Trainor, supra note 41 (asserting that courts are “putting the brakes on extreme 
disciplinary measures taken by districts against harassers or bullies”); Erb, supra note 40, at 
271 (describing the current trend of liberally granting First Amendment protection to off-
campus speech, even if it is vulgar, cruel, sexually explicit, and threatening); see also, e.g., 
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216 (“It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the 
state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his/her 
actions there to the same extent that it can control that child when he/she participates in 
school sponsored activities.”); Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 
(“For the Tinker test to have any reasonable limits, the word ‘substantial’ must equate to 
something more than the ordinary personality conflicts among middle school students that 
may leave one student feeling hurt or insecure.”). 
 246. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2007); Erb, supra note 40, at 
272. Compare O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs., No. CV 08-5671 ODW (AJWx), 2008 WL 4396895, at 
*2–3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (upholding school disciplinary action and explaining that a 
school need not show a substantial disruption actually occurred or was certain to occur, only 
that it was reasonably foreseeable), with Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 
446, 455–56 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (finding a First Amendment violation where the school could 
not prove that an actual disruption occurred or where the student had caused a substantial 
disruption in the past). 
 247. See, e.g., Layshock, 650 F.3d at 215–19; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 930–
33; Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1119–21; Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks 
Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 703–05 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 
205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800–01 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 454–56. But see, 
e.g., Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 113–15 (2d Cir. 2012); Kowalski, 652 
F.3d at 573–74; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40; LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 
990–91 (9th Cir. 2001); O.Z., 2008 WL 4396895, at *2–4. 
 248. See Schultz, supra note 38, at 4; Patchin, supra note 45; see also Barr & Lugus, 
supra note 146, at 772–73 (articulating the same concerns for administrators at institutions of 
higher education); infra Part III.A. 
 249. See Edwin C. Dardin, The Law and Its Influence on Public School Districts:  An 
Overview, CENTER FOR PUB. EDUC. (Apr. 5, 2006), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/
Main-Menu/Public-education/The-law-and-its-influence-on-public-school-districts-An-
overview; see also Donna K. Crawford & Richard J. Bodine, Conflict Resolution Education:  
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variety of similar sources:  social expectations, state and federal law, and 
judicial precedent.250  When these sources send mixed messages, it renders 
the already difficult decisions of educators far more challenging.251 
In the case of cyberbullying, state and federal lawmakers seem to be 
telling school officials that they have a duty to protect students from 
cyberbullies, even if the bullying occurs off campus.252  While only nine 
states and the District of Columbia have laws that include off-campus 
cyberbullying, bullying laws in general are fairly new, and these 
cyberbullying measures have all been passed in the last few years.253  Two 
other states—Nebraska and Georgia—have proposed legislation to include 
off-campus cyberbullying in state law.254  This appears to be a general trend 
among states.255  Federal lawmakers, while unable to push a federal 
cyberbullying bill through Congress, have issued interpretive guidelines 
indicating that schools may have a duty to police off-campus 
cyberbullying.256  Furthermore, significant social sentiment may indicate a 
desire to see schools more involved in regulating both bullying and 
cyberbullying more aggressively.257  When cyberbullying does occur 
among students with injurious consequences, “Why didn’t the school do 
anything?” is a common response.258 
On the other hand, lower courts have been protective of off-campus 
student speech, even when it is lewd, vulgar, mean, and degrading.259  In 
doing so, these courts are telling school district officials and school 
administrators to rein in disciplinary efforts even if they are aware of 
potential harm to students.260  Despite a desire to curb bullying and 
cyberbullying, there is still overwhelming agreement that a line must be 
drawn somewhere—schools surely cannot regulate all of their students’ 
activity, no matter what it is or where it takes place.261  To many, the 
 
Preparing Youth for the Future, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERVICE (June 2001), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/jjjournal_2001_6/jj3.html. 
 250. See Dardin, supra note 249. 
 251. See Schultz, supra note 38, at 4; Patchin, supra note 45; see also infra Part III.A. 
 252. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 253. See supra Parts I.A.3, II.A.1–2. 
 254. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 71. 
 255. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 256. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 79 (articulating a school’s duty to address 
“harassment incidents about which it knows or reasonably should have known” through 
investigation, and explicitly referencing the use of electronics, the internet, and activity 
taking place outside of school). 
 257. See, e.g., Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 32 (“It was particularly alarming, the 
district attorney said, that some teachers, administrators and other staff members at the 
school were aware of the harassment but did not stop it.”).  Parents of bullying victims often 
approach school administrators for help, as well. See supra notes 1–27 and accompanying 
text. 
 258. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 260. See supra notes 245–48 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(articulating the dangers of allowing schools to have unbridled off-campus authority); see 
also Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hile public schools are not 
 2013] A WEB OF LIABILITY 2763 
thought of “the government” extending its regulatory reach into student 
speech that originates in the home is crossing a constitutional line.262 
III.  PREVENTING SCHOOLS FROM GETTING STUCK IN THE MIDDLE:  
HARMONIZING STATE CYBERBULLYING LEGISLATION 
AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 
The unresolved questions are, if schools do have a duty to protect their 
students from off-campus cyberbullying, is there a way that they can do this 
while still respecting other students’ constitutional right to free speech?  
What will happen if schools continue to get mixed messages about how 
aggressively they should regulate, or how concerned they should be about 
liability?  Part III of this Note attempts to reconcile this apparent conflict.  
Part III.A predicts that continued mixed messaging will paralyze schools 
and prevent them from effectively addressing cyberbullying.  Part III.B 
argues that schools should be held accountable for policing cyberbullying 
but that this requires a greater degree of judicial deference to schools. 
A.  Conflicting Legislative and Judicial Messages 
Could Functionally Paralyze Schools 
This section argues that schools could be prevented from taking any 
action to curb cyberbullying since they are getting conflicting messages and 
incentives.  It asserts that the combination of new cyberbullying laws and 
courts’ protection of cyberbullies’ off-campus speech rights could expose 
schools to liability from both victims and aggressors.  This Note predicts 
that these mixed incentives could paralyze schools confronted with 
cyberbullying. 
1.  Schools May Face Potential Liability from Both 
Cyberbullying Victims and Cyberbullies 
In order for schools to face third-party liability for cyberbullying harm to 
students, courts would have to find a legal duty on the school’s part to 
protect those students.263  Courts are often hesitant to find that a 
government actor owes a duty to a specific individual as opposed to the 
public at large.264  Nonetheless, as state bullying and cyberbullying statutes 
become more explicit and expansive, they may create both social 
expectations and legal duties for schools to take action when they become 
 
run as democracies, neither are they run as Stalinist regimes.  Students do have First 
Amendment rights, and school officials do not have unfettered authority to regulate student 
speech.”). 
 262. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. But see Erb, supra note 40, at 280–81 
(taking umbrage with characterizing schools as “the government,” as schools have 
traditionally been seen as “mediating” institutions and an “extension of family life and 
parental interests”). 
 263. See supra Parts I.B.1, II.A.3. 
 264. See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
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aware that a student has been cyberbullied.265  Some states have articulated 
the liability implications of new bullying laws explicitly in statutes 
themselves, some have hinted at liability in statutory language, and others 
have said nothing.266  As these statutes are new, and because victims of 
cyberbullying have only begun to bring suits against school personnel and 
school districts for their injuries,267 only time will tell if courts allow 
victims of cyberbullying to bring these claims against schools.268 
Additionally, in states where a legal duty is imposed on schools to 
regulate cyberbullying, school districts and educators are less likely to be 
granted sovereign and qualified immunity for discretionary actions.269  As 
the preventive and responsive measures to cyberbullying in schools 
becomes more tightly delineated through statutes and school district 
policies, the manner in which administrators and teachers handle 
cyberbullying will become less discretionary and more procedural.270  
Consequently, immunity will be unavailable because the educator merely 
failed to follow appropriate procedure on how to handle a case of 
cyberbullying and did not make a “policy” decision.271 
Holding schools responsible for policing harmful cyberbullying and 
imposing liability when they fail to do so is not problematic per se.  Our 
legal system often encourages certain behavior (and discourages others) by 
imposing liability.272  The problem is that schools must be able to combat 
the harm that results from off-campus cyberbullying if they are to be held 
responsible for it.273  This necessarily requires disciplining students for 
speech that “originates” in homes or other places remote from the 
schoolhouse.274  Courts have often been protective of student speech even if 
 
 265. See supra notes 113–15, 226–29 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 225 and accompanying text; see also Shariff & Hoff, supra note 150, 
at 85 (“While school administrators and teachers argue that they cannot possibly be expected 
to supervise students on home computers, parents are increasingly beginning to sue schools 
. . . for failing to protect their children.”). 
 268. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 113–14, 226–29 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 113–14, 226–29 and accompanying text. 
 272. See KEETON, supra note 86, at 25 (“When the decisions of the courts become known, 
and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to 
prevent the occurrence of the harm.  Not infrequently one reason for imposing liability is the 
deliberate purpose of providing that incentive.”). 
 273. See Jasperson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. A06-1904, 2007 
WL 3153456, at *4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2007) (assessing a school’s ability to prevent 
the harm in question when making a duty determination); Mirand v. City of N.Y., 84 N.Y.2d 
44, 49–50 (1994) (discussing a school’s control over foreseeable events in making a duty 
determination); see also KEETON, supra note 86, at 24–25 (discussing the role of a 
defendant’s capacity to avoid or prevent harm as a factor in imposing liability). 
 274. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(characterizing the question of the “location” of the speech as “metaphysical,” explaining 
that though the bully “pushed her computer’s keys” at home, the speech was sure to make its 
way to the school environment); see also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 
220–21 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring) (“For better or worse, wireless internet access, 
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it is crude, vulgar, or damaging.275  As a result, these courts have found 
schools in violation of the First Amendment.276  Even if there is no 
monetary liability because of immunity or the judgment is small, these 
cases can be highly publicized and send schools the message that they may 
not only be dragged through arduous litigation for policing cyberbullying 
too vigorously, but they may well lose in the end.277 
2.  Potential Liability to Both the Victim and the Bully, Paired with 
Mixed Messages, Could Lead to Confusion and Paralysis 
If schools face liability from victims of cyberbullying when they do not 
act aggressively to combat it, and liability from off-campus bullies should 
courts find that schools have violated cyberbullies’ First Amendment rights, 
they will be stuck in a “lose-lose” situation.278  The current advice to school 
leaders seems to be “don’t do nothing, don’t do too much.”279  Since legal 
liability provides a powerful incentive in either case,280 school officials are 
pushed in both directions—action and inaction—and end up frozen in an 
utter state of confusion.281 
B.  A Proposed Balance:  Holding Schools Accountable for Protecting 
Students with Greater Judicial Deference 
This Note attempts to reconcile the apparent conflicting messages that 
legislatures and courts are sending to schools dealing with cyberbullying.  It 
asserts that schools should be held accountable for protecting their students 
from cyberbullying if state statutes impose such a duty.  It also posits that if 
schools have a duty to affirmatively protect students from cyberbullying, 
courts must be more deferential when applying Tinker’s substantial-effects 
test. 
 
smart phones, tablet computers, social networking services like Facebook, and stream-of-
consciousness communications via Twitter give an omnipresence to speech that makes any 
effort to trace First Amendment boundaries along the physical boundaries of a school 
campus a recipe for serious problems in our public schools.”). 
 275. See supra notes 40, 245 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 277. See, e.g., J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1121–22, 1124–26 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding a First Amendment violation but also finding 
that individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity); see also supra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
 278. See Schultz, supra note 38, at 3 (asserting that, since federal courts have begun 
sending the message that antibullying measures may impinge on students’ First Amendment 
rights, school districts are “finding themselves in the lose-lose situation of potentially being 
sued both by the victim and the perpetrator of harassing or bullying conduct”); see also 
supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 279. See Schultz, supra note 38, at 4. 
 280. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Schools Should Be Held Accountable for Ensuring Students’ Safety by 
Regulating Off-Campus Speech 
The current trend in state law is to broaden school regulatory authority to 
off-campus cyberbullying consistent with the language of Tinker.282  In 
states that have passed aggressive bullying and cyberbullying legislation of 
this nature, courts should interpret these statutes to hold schools responsible 
for their duty to protect students from harm, even if the bullying originates 
off campus, unless the statute provides otherwise.283  The legislation 
reflects a determination that schools are often best positioned to regulate 
such conduct despite the fact that it occurs away from the schoolhouse.284  
The bullying and cyberbullying legislative boom also mirrors a broader 
social desire to see schools more aggressively involved in ensuring their 
students’ safety.285 
If courts interpret these new laws to impose a duty on schools to police 
cyberbullying activity, it will be the first step in sending a consistent 
message to educators; the public, legislatures, and courts will begin to be on 
the same page about how a school official should react when confronted 
with an instance of cyberbullying.286  To liberate schools from a confusing 
 
 282. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 283. See supra Part II.A.3; cf. Frank LoMonte, School Districts Chafing at Cyberbullying 
Liability Should Have Heeded the “Spider-Man Rule,” STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER (Dec. 23, 
2010), http://www.splc.org/wordpress/?p=1355 (“Expanded liability is the reward that 
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attempt to determine the best or most practical solution to the cyberbullying problem.  
Instead, it asserts that if state legislatures intend to impose a duty to protect students from 
such activity by statute, then courts should hold schools to this duty.  However, there are 
many diverse scholarly opinions on the best solution to the cyberbullying problem. See 
Beckstrom, supra note 60, at 311 (arguing that, because of the confusing case law and 
disparate results, a school’s authority should be limited to its campus unless the speech 
constitutes a threat); Shariff & Hoff, supra note 150, at 79, 88–107 (arguing for greater 
school authority because parents are often too busy to notice cyberbullying and schools 
should honor their “mandate as educational leaders” by “teach[ing] students the boundaries 
of socially acceptable behavior” and preparing them for life in a democratic society); Erb, 
supra note 40, at 275–82 (arguing for greater school authority since schools are “mediating 
institutions” and should not be treated as typical government actors); Scott Farbish, Note, 
Sending the Principal to the Warden’s Office:  Holding School Officials Criminally Liable 
for Failing To Report Cyberbullying, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 109, 122–29 (2011) 
(arguing that schools are in a unique position to monitor cyberbullying and should be 
criminally penalized for failing to do so); Lane, supra note 223, at 1802–05 (arguing for 
greater deference from courts, pointing out the “practical realities of the ways schools 
interact with their students,” and noting “the lack of effective remedies available to 
victims”); Turley, supra note 60 (arguing that the most problematic aspect of cyberbullying 
is not necessarily the lack of oversight but the lack of options for relief for victims and the 
culprits not facing public scrutiny or stigma). 
 284. See supra notes 252–59 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra Parts I.A.2–3, II.A.1. 
 286. See supra Part II.C. 
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web of liability entanglement, however, courts must also change the way 
they apply Tinker to new instances of cyberbullying, an idea explored in the 
next section. 
2.  Greater Judicial Deference:  A Less Stringent Reading of 
Tinker’s Substantial-Effects Test 
If new state laws do impose a legal duty on schools to regulate 
cyberbullying, then courts should apply Tinker’s substantial-effects test 
with greater deference to schools.287 
Courts have already been hesitant to find that off-campus student speech 
will foreseeably and substantially effect the learning environment.288  
Additionally, although schools are often able to come forward with 
significant evidence that cyberbullying has affected a particular student’s 
ability to learn, measuring and obtaining evidence of broader school-wide 
disruption or hypothetical future disruption can be very challenging.289 
Lower courts should take a more individual and deferential reading of 
“substantial effect” by incorporating the effect on the person who has been 
bullied and not just the school environment as a whole, as well as allowing 
the school latitude in forecasting potential outcomes of the off-campus 
speech.290  This reading of Tinker allows schools to focus on preventing 
harm to students as individuals if harm is likely to occur, rather than 
worrying about whether the effect on the school environment as a whole is 
“substantial enough” to warrant intervention.291  As the First Amendment 
does not protect students’ right to interfere substantially with the learning of 
other students,292 this approach would allow schools to fulfill their duty to 
protect students from cyberbullying while respecting free speech rights off 
campus. 
CONCLUSION 
With the development and growing ubiquity of communication 
technology, cyberbullying has emerged as a pervasive national problem 
similar to, but in many ways more complicated and invidious than, 
traditional bullying.  Lawmakers in many states have attempted to 
counteract cyberbullying by expanding schools’ regulatory authority off 
campus and into the home.  Indeed, states’ aggressive new legislation has 
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created a sense that schools may have a legal duty to protect their students 
from cyberbullies, even if the speech originates off campus.  This is 
problematic because courts have generally protected students’ freedom of 
speech off campus. 
The current legal landscape could result in paralysis, with school officials 
wanting to avoid liability for failing to protect students from cyberbullies 
but also wishing to avoid violating cyberbullies’ First Amendment rights.  
If schools are to take on greater responsibility, they must be given greater 
latitude to act outside of the physical schoolhouse.  Courts’ applications of 
Tinker’s substantial-effects test have been inconsistent, and interpretations 
of what constitutes a “substantial effect” have been too narrow.  If courts 
take a more deferential reading of “substantial effect” at the level of the 
individual student, schools could uphold their duties to protect students 
from cyberbullying while respecting students’ off-campus freedom of 
speech. 
